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 The Common Law Confessions  
Rule in the Charter Era:  
Current Law and Future Directions 
Lisa Dufraimont* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The confessions rule stands out as something of an oddity among 
the procedural protections afforded to criminal suspects in Canada. In  
an age of constitutional safeguards, the common law rule excluding 
involuntary confessions remains the suspect’s best protection against 
coercive interrogation. Admittedly, the confessions rule has attained some 
indeterminate constitutional status under the Charter.1 The Supreme 
Court of Canada has suggested that the rule constitutes a principle of 
fundamental justice under section 7.2 But that Court has also held that 
the Charter has not subsumed the confessions rule, which continues to 
apply as a matter of common law.3 The constitutional aspect of the 
doctrine reflects the reality that protecting individuals from coercive 
police interrogation is a matter of fundamental rights. 
In R. v. Oickle,4 the Supreme Court compendiously restated the 
confessions rule for the first time since the advent of the Charter. Recently, 
in R. v. Spencer,5 the Court amplified on Oickle, providing further guidance 
on when interrogation tactics vitiate a confession’s voluntariness. Then, 
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in R. v. Singh,6 the Court clarified the relationship between the confessions 
rule and the pre-trial right to silence under section 7 of the Charter. This 
paper aims, first, to evaluate the current law and, second, to point to 
some possible directions for the future. It is argued that the confessions 
rule represents a modest but crucial safeguard for the criminal accused. 
The rule goes some distance toward preventing wrongful convictions 
based on unreliable confessions and ensuring fair treatment for interrogated 
suspects. But more can and should be done to reach these goals. 
II. BACKGROUND ON THE CONFESSIONS RULE 
The confessions rule provides that any out-of-court statement made 
by an accused person to a person in authority is inadmissible against the 
accused unless the prosecution proves beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the statement was voluntary.7 Police officers are paradigmatic persons in 
authority, and the rule operates primarily to set “common law limits on 
police interrogation”.8 Since the origins of the rule in 18th-century English 
law,9 debate has focused on two questions: What does voluntariness mean? 
And what policy does the confessions rule aim to promote? 
The definition question gave rise, historically, to a long debate in 
Canadian law between those who argued that a voluntary confession 
meant one obtained without threats or promises from the authorities and 
those who contended that voluntariness had a more expansive meaning.10 
The former, narrower, view was based on classical English formulations of 
the rule, which defined voluntariness negatively by excluding confessions 
obtained by “fear of prejudice or hope of advantage exercised or held 
out by a person in authority”.11 Over time, some courts began to question 
whether the negative definition of voluntariness focused on the absence 
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 [2007] S.C.J. No. 48, 2007 SCC 48 (S.C.C.). 
7
 R. v. Hodgson, [1998] S.C.J. No. 66, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 449, at para. 12 (S.C.C.); R. v. 
Erven, [1978] S.C.J. No. 114, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 926, at 931 (S.C.C.); R. v. Sabri, [2002] O.J.  
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Press, 2003) at 220-21. 
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the Doctrine of Confessions” (1980) 18 Osgoode Hall L.J. 146, at 155. 
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2 S.C.R. 449, at para. 15 (S.C.C.). 
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of threats and promises was intended to be exhaustive.12 Increasingly, 
confessions were excluded not only when elicited by threats or promises 
but also when obtained in oppressive conditions, or from a suspect 
without an operating mind.13 Voluntariness came to be seen not merely 
as a question of freedom from threats and promises, but as a broader, 
positive, concept.14 
Like the definition of voluntariness, the policy basis for the confessions 
rule has shifted over time. The rule has traditionally been justified on two 
distinct grounds.15 The first justification ― the reliability rationale ― is 
that involuntary confessions are excluded because they are often untrue. 
The second justification ― the fair treatment rationale ― is that the rule 
maintains standards of fairness and discourages official mistreatment of 
suspects by preventing the state from relying on coerced statements. 
Historically, the confessions rule arose primarily out of a concern that 
coerced confessions were untrustworthy and that relying on them could 
lead to convictions of the innocent.16 Over time, the fair treatment rationale 
grew in prominence to the extent that “concern for the administration of 
justice and fundamental principles of fairness” came to be recognized as 
a key policy underpinning the rule.17 
III. OVERVIEW OF THE CURRENT LAW 
These debates about the meaning and justification of the confessions 
rule have largely been resolved. Oickle18 established the reliability rationale 
as the primary policy basis for the exclusion of involuntary confessions 
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Confessions” (1980) 18 Osgoode Hall L.J. 146; Edmund Thomas, “Lowering the Standard: R. v. 
Oickle and the Confessions Rule in Canada” (2005) 10 Can. Crim. L. Rev. 69. 
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 See, e.g., R. v. Hodgson, [1998] S.C.J. No. 66, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 449, at para. 17 (S.C.C.). 
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 See R. v. Hodgson, [1998] S.C.J. No. 66, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 449, at para. 18 (S.C.C.). 
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 R. v. Oickle, [2000] S.C.J. No. 38, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.). 
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in modern Canadian law.19 For a majority of the Court, Iacobucci J. 
explained that the confessions rule needed to be restated in light of the 
developing understanding of the phenomenon of false confessions.20 At 
the same time, the majority emphasized that the protections afforded the 
accused under the confessions rule must always be balanced against 
society’s interest in effectively investigating crimes.21 
Justice Iacobucci drew on social science research, accepting that 
hundreds of verifiably false confessions have been offered in real cases, 
cataloguing various types of false confessions, and discussing the police 
tactics that are prone to elicit these untruthful statements.22 The majority 
stressed that the risk of eliciting a false confession may be heightened 
by a suspect’s particularities and vulnerabilities, or when police confront 
suspects with fabricated evidence or offer inducements in the form of 
threats or promises.23 Ultimately, a trial judge must determine whether a 
confession is voluntary, not whether it is true.24 But since involuntary 
confessions are often unreliable, Canada’s “common law confessions 
rule is well-suited to protect against false confessions”.25 
Oickle26 confirmed that the confessions rule is concerned not  
only with inducements in the form of threats or promises but “with 
voluntariness, broadly understood”.27 The question is whether, taking all 
the circumstances into account, the statement was voluntary.28 The 
voluntariness analysis is necessarily contextual,29 and the trial judge’s 
decision is entitled to deference on appeal.30 Threats or promises still 
vitiate voluntariness where, alone or together with other factors, they 
“are strong enough to raise a reasonable doubt about whether the will of 
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 R. v. Oickle, [2000] S.C.J. No. 38, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 3, at para. 71 (S.C.C.). 
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 See R. v. Oickle, [2000] S.C.J. No. 38, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 3, at paras. 22-23 (S.C.C.); R. v. 
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the subject has been overborne”.31 Justice Iacobucci recognized that 
confessions might be rendered involuntary by a variety of inducements, 
including threats of violence, promises of leniency, offers of psychological 
help, threats against friends and family, and implicit inducements.32 The 
majority indicated that police may legitimately “offer some kind of 
inducement” to convince suspects to confess.33 But they cross the line 
from appropriate persuasion to improper inducements when they offer 
suspects something in return for their confessions: “The most important 
consideration in all cases is to look for a quid pro quo offer by interrogators, 
regardless of whether it comes in the form of a threat or a promise.”34 
Alongside such inducements are other factors that can raise doubts 
about voluntariness. Justice Iacobucci confirmed that interrogating a 
suspect under oppressive conditions could make a resulting statement 
involuntary.35 Oppression can result when necessaries like food, water, 
clothing or sleep are withheld; when interrogation is particularly hostile, 
intimidating or prolonged; or when police use fabricated evidence to 
make the case against the suspect seem overwhelming.36 
A third component of the voluntariness inquiry identified in Oickle37 
is the operating mind test.38 Confessions are involuntary when they are 
elicited from suspects who lack an operating mind in the sense that they 
do not know what they are saying or that they are saying it to police 
who may use it against them.39 Confessions from injured or hypnotized 
suspects, for example, can be excluded on this basis.40 Like inducements 
and oppression, the operating mind test forms a part of the overall 
voluntariness test.41 
The majority observed that voluntariness is a broader concept than 
reliability and confessions will sometimes be excluded in order to 
uphold standards of fairness within the criminal justice system.42 This 
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 R. v. Oickle, [2000] S.C.J. No. 38, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 3, at paras. 26-27 (S.C.C.); R. v. 
Whittle, [1994] S.C.J. No. 69, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 914, at 941 (S.C.C.). 
41
 R. v. Oickle, [2000] S.C.J. No. 38, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 3, at para. 64 (S.C.C). 
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concern about the integrity of the justice system underpins the fourth 
and final branch of the confessions rule, which allows confessions to  
be excluded when they are obtained through police trickery.43 Such 
confessions should be excluded, according to the majority, where the 
police conduct “is so appalling as to shock the community”.44 This 
community shock test constitutes a “distinct inquiry” from the main 
voluntariness test,45 so shocking tactics may lead to the exclusion of a 
confession even when they do not “undermin[e] voluntariness per se”.46 
After explaining the voluntariness inquiry, Iacobucci J. applied this 
analysis to a series of confessions that formed the primary basis of 
Richard Oickle’s conviction on seven counts of arson. Justice Iacobucci 
agreed with the trial judge that the statements were voluntary despite a 
number of troubling features of the interrogation that might, alone or 
taken together, have raised a doubt on that issue. For example, the 
police repeatedly suggested that if Oickle did not confess, they might 
subject his fiancée to interrogation or a polygraph test.47 According to 
Iacobucci J., this threat was neither strong enough nor sufficiently 
connected to Oickle’s confessions to render them involuntary.48 Oickle’s 
interrogators also referred continually to the polygraph test he took at 
the beginning of the interview, which the police said he had failed. The 
police took the position that the polygraph machine does not lie, and, 
therefore, that they already knew Oickle had set some of the fires.49 On 
one view of the interrogation, espoused by Arbour J. in dissent, these 
incessant references to the infallible polygraph led Oickle to believe that 
his claims of innocence were futile and that, inevitably, he would have 
to confess to something.50 However, the majority held that, while the 
police put some pressure on Oickle, his confessions were voluntary in 
all the circumstances.51 
With its detailed explanation of the voluntariness inquiry, Oickle52 
remains the leading Canadian case on the confessions rule. In the two 
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 R. v. Oickle, [2000] S.C.J. No. 38, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 3, at para. 69 (S.C.C.). 
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 R. v. Oickle, [2000] S.C.J. No. 38, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 3, at para. 65 (S.C.C.). 
46
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 R. v. Oickle, [2000] S.C.J. No. 38, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 3, at para. 122 (S.C.C.), Arbour J., 
dissenting. 
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 R. v. Oickle, [2000] S.C.J. No. 38, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 3, at para. 99 (S.C.C.). 
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(2008), 40 S.C.L.R. (2d) THE COMMON LAW CONFESSIONS RULE 255 
recent cases of Spencer and Singh,53 however, the Supreme Court shed 
further light on the rule. Spencer concerned inducements to confess: on 
the facts, police refused to allow the accused to visit his girlfriend until 
he “cleaned his slate” by offering a statement implicating himself in 
several robberies.54 According to Deschamps J., who wrote for a majority 
of the Supreme Court,55 a confession may be admissible even when the 
police offer the accused an inducement to confess as a quid pro quo.56 
Stressing the contextual analysis mandated in Oickle, Deschamps J. held 
that the existence of a quid pro quo is only a factor, albeit an important 
factor, in the voluntariness analysis: “it is the strength of the inducement, 
having regard to the particular individual and his or her circumstances, that 
is to be considered” in assessing voluntariness.57 Applying this principle 
to the case, Deschamps J. agreed with the trial judge that withholding the 
visit to the girlfriend until after the accused confessed was not a strong 
enough inducement to make the accused’s statements involuntary.58 
The Supreme Court’s most recent comments on the confessions rule 
emerged in Singh,59 which concerned scope of the section 7 pre-trial 
right to silence. The accused had been arrested in connection with a 
shooting death, and had consulted with a lawyer. Police subsequently 
interrogated the accused, who asserted his right to silence 18 times 
during the interrogation before making certain admissions. The accused 
argued at trial that the admissions were involuntary and that, in the 
alternative, they should be excluded because they were obtained in 
violation of the section 7 right to silence. The trial judge ruled the 
statements voluntary and rejected the section 7 claim, and the majority 
of the Supreme Court upheld the trial judge’s decision and affirmed the 
accused’s conviction for second degree murder. For the majority, 
Charron J.60 held that, when a detainee is interrogated by known police, 
the section 7 pre-trial right to silence provides no protection to the 
accused beyond the protection offered by the confessions rule. In such 
                                                                                                            
53
 R. v. Spencer, [2007] S.C.J. No. 11, 2007 SCC 11 (S.C.C.); R. v. Singh, [2007] S.C.J. 
No. 48, 2007 SCC 48 (S.C.C.). 
54
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60
 Justice Charron wrote the majority reasons for five members of the Court; Fish J. delivered 
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circumstances, “the confessions rule effectively subsumes the constitutional 
right to silence”.61 
The majority in Singh62 explained that the Charter right to silence 
protects an accused’s freedom to choose whether to speak with authorities 
but does not oblige police to stop questioning a detainee who asserts a 
choice to remain silent.63 Police may continue to question an accused 
who has asserted the right to silence and may use “legitimate means of 
persuasion” to obtain a confession.64 At some point, however, “police 
persistence in continuing the interview, despite repeated assertions by the 
detainee that he wishes to remain silent, may well raise a strong argument 
that any subsequently obtained statement was not the product of a free 
will to speak to the authorities.”65 Any statement that was not the product 
of the detainee’s free will, will be involuntary and therefore inadmissible. 
Singh forecloses resort to section 7 as unnecessary: the confessions rule 
already protects the right to silence in interrogations by known police.66 
IV. STRENGTHS AND LIMITATIONS OF THE CURRENT APPROACH 
Taken together, Oickle,67 Spencer68 and Singh69 provide a clear picture 
of the confessions rule as it currently exists in Canada. We have seen 
that the rule excluding involuntary confessions constitutes a safeguard 
for the accused that pursues two distinct goals: to exclude unreliable 
evidence and to ensure fair and decent treatment of interrogated suspects. 
The current rule seems reasonably capable of advancing the first goal  
by excluding false confessions and preventing wrongful convictions. By 
contrast, the rule appears relatively ill suited to advance the second goal, 
since it places only weak and indirect restraints on officials who interrogate 
suspects. In any event, the rule’s capacity to advance either goal is limited 
by the balance that must be maintained between defensive safeguard on 
the one hand and effective investigation of crimes on the other. 
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 R. v. Singh, [2007] S.C.J. No. 48, 2007 SCC 48, at para. 39 (S.C.C.). 
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(2008), 40 S.C.L.R. (2d) THE COMMON LAW CONFESSIONS RULE 257 
1. Excluding Unreliable Evidence 
Given that Oickle70 emphasized the reliability rationale for the 
confessions rule, it seems unsurprising that the rule appears reasonably 
well calibrated to identify and exclude false confessions. Drawing on 
insights from social science, the Supreme Court has framed a rule that 
responds meaningfully to the false confessions problem.71 For example, 
research suggests that the stresses of interrogation can cause false 
confessions when they are directed at vulnerable individuals or when 
anxiety-provoking tactics, such as questioning suspects aggressively or 
over long periods, are taken to extremes.72 Suspects may offer “stress-
compliant” false confessions, admitting guilt in order to escape the 
intolerable conditions of the interrogation, regardless of the long-term 
consequences.73 In Oickle, Iacobucci J. recognized the risk of stress-
compliant false confessions and explained that confessions elicited in 
intolerable conditions can be excluded under the doctrine of oppression.74 
Similarly, the psychological literature supports the majority’s call for 
sensitivity to the particularities and vulnerabilities of the individual 
suspect.75 Unusually suggestible or compliant individuals, including young 
people and those suffering from mental deficits, are especially likely to 
confess falsely under the pressure of interrogation.76 
In many other areas, too, the confessions rule as explained in Oickle77 
responds to known risk factors for false confessions. Research supports 
the majority’s assertion that special risks arise when police use fabricated 
evidence or make threats or promises.78 Confronting innocent suspects 
with fabricated but apparently incontrovertible evidence of their guilt 
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can convince them that, since they are certain to be convicted, they have 
nothing to lose by confessing falsely.79 Indeed, this tactic has been known 
to make innocent suspects so desperate and confused that they come to 
believe they must be guilty.80 Threats and promises have been known to 
elicit many false confessions, especially when interrogators have instilled 
a sense of hopelessness in the suspect. Suspects who believe they have 
nothing to lose may confess falsely to obtain some promised advantage 
or avoid some threatened harm held out by interrogators.81 
In short, Oickle82 has the potential to sensitize trial judges to various 
risk factors and questionable interrogation tactics that are associated 
with false confessions. As judges incorporate these insights into the 
voluntariness inquiry, the confessions rule becomes a better vehicle for 
excluding false statements. Consequently, Canada’s confessions rule 
appears reasonably well suited to exclude unreliable evidence. 
2. Ensuring Fair Treatment of Interrogated Suspects 
The rule appears less successful as a restraint on coercive interrogation. 
Of course, as discussed above, Oickle83 identified a variety of interrogation 
tactics that could, in the right circumstances, render a confession 
involuntary. But, as propounded in Oickle and refined in Spencer84 and 
Singh,85 the modern confessions rule imposes few clear limits on police. 
Confessions resulting from “outright violence” and “imminent threats of 
torture” will always be involuntary.86 But beyond these rather extreme 
examples, no police tactic is entirely off-limits under the rule.87 In Oickle, 
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Iacobucci J. strongly disapproved the practice of offering charge or 
sentence reductions in return for self-incriminating statements, but even 
such promises of leniency may be permissible “in … exceptional 
circumstances”.88 Under classical formulations of the rule, confessions 
elicited by threats and promises were involuntary by definition, and there 
was language in Oickle to suggest that quid pro quo offers by interrogators 
were per se improper, warranting exclusion of any resulting statement.89 
That interpretation of Oickle has been foreclosed by Spencer, which 
stands for the proposition that offering a quid pro quo does not necessarily 
render a resulting confession involuntary.90 Singh similarly avoids placing 
any clear limits on interrogators; persistent interrogation of a detainee in 
the face of repeated assertions of the right to silence will not vitiate 
voluntariness unless the court determines that police deprived the detainee 
of the free will to choose whether to speak.91 
The fact that the confessions rule imposes few clear limits on police 
reflects the Court’s conscious avoidance of “hard and fast” rules under 
the voluntariness inquiry.92 The contextual approach, which eschews 
categorical judgments about specific interrogation practices, gives police 
flexibility to use a wide range of tactics to pressure suspects to confess.93 
From the perspective of law enforcement, this flexibility is a desirable 
feature of the confessions rule.94 But if the rule aims, in part, to put 
limits on interrogation, then the current doctrine can be criticized for 
failing to provide clear and useful guidance. Classical formulations of 
the rule had the advantage of clarity: police could easily understand a rule 
prohibiting them from making threats or promises. Police are unlikely to 
glean so much guidance from the current rule, which promises a nuanced 
analysis but places few discernible limits on interrogation practices. 
To be sure, the confessions rule continues to restrain coercive 
interrogation indirectly through the voluntariness inquiry. Certain police 
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practices will be deemed improper where, in a contextual analysis, they 
raise a reasonable doubt as to voluntariness. And of course, police can 
be expected to be careful in employing tactics ― sleep deprivation,  
intimidating questioning, and veiled threats against family members to 
name a few ― that the Court has said might, in all the circumstances, 
render a confession unreliable and involuntary. At the same time, the 
Supreme Court’s focus on reliability means that, under the confessions 
rule, restraints on police behaviour as such are de-emphasized. As Don 
Stuart has pointed out, Oickle95 permits “[a] free-standing inquiry into 
the legitimacy of police methods” only in the context of the community 
shock test, which the Court has segregated from the larger voluntariness 
inquiry.96 Moreover, community shock represents such a high threshold 
that few police tactics will be ruled impermissible on this basis. In sum, 
the confessions rule provides only weak and indirect assurances that 
suspects will be treated fairly in the interrogation room. 
3. Balancing Defensive Safeguard against Law Enforcement 
In its approach to the confessions rule, the Supreme Court has sought 
to maintain a balance between safeguarding suspects’ rights and allowing 
police scope to investigate crimes.97 So long as the confessions rule reflects 
this balance, difficult questions about the fair treatment of suspects and 
the reliability of confessions are unavoidable. The law requires trial 
judges to draw the line between acceptable persuasion and improper 
coercion on a case-by-case basis. Despite its merits, this approach leaves 
open the door for coercive practices to be used by police and condoned 
by courts in individual cases. 
It also seems inevitable that false confessions will sometimes be 
admitted into evidence under the voluntariness rule. Justice Iacobucci 
insisted in Oickle98 that “proper police techniques” rarely give rise to false 
confessions.99 But the very question before the Court ― which was never 
clearly answered ― was which interrogation techniques are proper.  
The notion that false confessions can be easily distinguished from true 
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confessions, that the tactics that produce them differ in kind, is nothing 
but a comforting illusion. Under current law, police may continue to 
employ modern methods of psychological interrogation, which use pressure 
and manipulation to overcome suspects’ resistance.100 While they are meant 
to be used on guilty suspects, these techniques can also cause the innocent 
to confess.101 Both false confessions and coercive practices will continue to 
arise as long as the confessions rule embodies a robust compromise 
between defensive safeguard and law enforcement. 
V. FORTIFYING THE CONFESSIONS RULE 
The confessions rule can be imagined as an edifice of defensive 
safeguard, built to shelter the accused from official mistreatment and 
from being prosecuted on the basis of unreliable evidence. As we have 
seen, this structure provides a basic level of protection against both of 
these dangers, though its construction is better suited to offer shelter from 
the risk of false confessions. We have observed, too, that this edifice 
stands under constant stress from the exigencies of law enforcement. It 
remains to be considered whether the doctrinal edifice of the confessions 
rule can be fortified. 
Two kinds of fortification can be envisaged. First, the doctrine 
could be reinforced from within by refining the confessions rule itself. 
Alternatively, the doctrine could be buttressed from without by related 
legal rules that complement the confessions rule and advance its aims. 
The pages that follow present ideas for fortifications of both kinds. 
Some of these ideas are established or developing in Canadian law, while 
others are more speculative. What they all have in common is that they 
represent ways in which the law could better advance the goals of the 
confessions rule without compromising the ability of police to investigate 
crimes and enforce the law. 
1. Developing Clearer Limits on Interrogation 
One way the confessions rule might be reinforced is by adding further 
categorical limits on acceptable interrogation practices. The current 
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approach to voluntariness imposes few firm boundaries on police tactics, 
but more such boundaries may develop in the future. Dale Ives has 
suggested that Canada’s confessions rule could be improved by requiring 
continuous interrogations to be broken up with regular breaks and by 
prohibiting police from confronting suspects with fabricated forensic 
evidence to make the case seem overwhelming.102 Steven Penney has 
offered similar prescriptions, suggesting that the length of interrogations 
be limited, that interrogation of vulnerable suspects be restricted and 
that police be prohibited from confronting suspects with false evidence 
or misrepresenting the strength of the evidence.103 Innovations of these 
kinds, targeted at police methods that are unacceptably coercive or strongly 
associated with false confessions, could enhance the accused’s protection 
against unfair treatment and unreliable evidence without unduly interfering 
with the police investigations. Such developments would provide clearer 
guidance to police on what interrogation practices will not be tolerated. 
Oickle,104 Spencer105 and Singh106 all worked to sweep away categorical 
rules within the voluntariness inquiry, but this trend may not last  
forever. The contextual approach to voluntariness does not exclude the 
possibility that the courts, or indeed Parliament, may in future rule 
certain interrogation tactics out-of-bounds.107 
2. Focusing on the Suspect’s Vulnerabilities 
Another way to reinforce the confessions rule would be to focus greater 
attention on the vulnerabilities of interrogated suspects. The research 
literature identifies two kinds of factors that contribute to false confessions: 
the vulnerabilities of the suspect and the coercion or manipulation 
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employed by police interrogators.108 The Supreme Court’s confessions 
rule jurisprudence deals more fully with the latter set of factors than the 
former. Thus, Oickle109 has been criticized for offering insufficient guidance 
on evaluating confessions from vulnerable suspects.110 This criticism 
may be somewhat unfair, given that Iacobucci J. emphasized “the need 
to be sensitive to the particularities of the individual suspect” and identified 
some of the personal characteristics that might make a suspect vulnerable.111 
Oickle himself was not, on the record, an especially vulnerable suspect, 
so it is not clear what more should have been said. Still, one hopes that 
future cases will offer fuller guidance on what vulnerabilities should be 
considered and how they affect the voluntariness inquiry. This enrichment 
of the vulnerability analysis could reinforce the safeguard provided by 
the confessions rule. 
3. Recording Interrogations and Confessions 
With the exception of the confessions rule itself, the most commonly 
suggested safeguard against coercive interrogation and false confessions 
is the recording ― preferably on video ― of police interrogations. 
Recording interrogations can deter police abuses, eliminate disputes 
about what police and suspects said and did in the interrogation room, 
and provide judges and juries with the best information on which to 
assess the voluntariness and reliability of confessions.112 While most 
commentators agree that, ideally, police should record their entire 
interrogations along with the confessions themselves, there is less 
agreement over the consequences that should follow when such recordings 
are incomplete or never made at all. Some suggest that unrecorded 
confessions should be inadmissible at trial, but many would not go  
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that far.113 Currently, Canadian law imposes no mandatory recording 
requirement. In Oickle,114 Iacobucci J. encouraged the police practice of 
recording interrogations and enumerated its advantages, but insisted that 
non-recorded interrogations are not “inherently suspect”.115 
In a series of cases decided after Oickle,116 the Ontario Court of 
Appeal has held that, where recording facilities exist, failure by police 
to record an interrogation militates against crediting the police version 
of events and makes any resulting statement suspect.117 A choice by 
police to interrogate a suspect without recording the interview on readily 
available equipment weighs against a prosecutor seeking to establish 
voluntariness.118 Such a failure to make a record can also be the subject 
of a special jury instruction indicating that deliberate non-recording 
undermines the value of police testimony about alleged confessions.119 
While not universally accepted,120 the Ontario approach has much to 
commend it. Surely the most persuasive reason for the Supreme Court’s 
reluctance to impose a mandatory recording requirement is that such a 
requirement could put onerous demands on police to procure and 
maintain recording facilities and to record every interaction with suspects 
inside and outside the station. By focusing on failures to record where 
equipment is available, the Court of Appeal has found a way to encourage 
recording that accords with the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence and avoids 
the pitfall of placing impossible burdens on police. This approach to the 
problem of recording interrogations merits wider acceptance in Canadian 
law. 
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4. Relying on Other Charter Rights 
Like the confessions rule, the Charter rights to silence under section 
7 and to counsel under section 10(b) regulate the use of an accused’s 
self-incriminating statements. These rights buttress the confessions rule; 
they are independent protections that complement the voluntariness  
rule and advance its aims. As the Supreme Court has observed, the 
confessions rule and the rights to silence and counsel “operate together 
to provide not only a standard of reliability with respect to evidence 
obtained from persons suspected of crime who are detained but fairness 
in the investigatory process”.121 In Oickle,122 Iacobucci J. identified three 
respects in which the confessions rule offers broader protection to the 
accused than related rights under the Charter.123 First, the confessions 
rule applies whether or not the suspect is detained, while the right to 
counsel is triggered only on arrest or detention. Second, the prosecution 
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a confession is voluntary, 
while the burden of establishing a Charter breach lies on the accused  
on a balance of probabilities. And third, involuntary confessions are 
automatically excluded, while statements obtained in breach of Charter 
rights are excluded only if admitting them would bring the administration 
of justice into disrepute. 
In other areas, the Charter provides broader protection than the 
confessions rule. For example, the section 7 pre-trial right to silence can 
exclude statements elicited from detainees through undercover operations, 
while the confessions rule applies only where a suspect believes he or she 
is speaking with a person in authority.124 The Supreme Court recognized 
the right to silence under section 7 in Hebert, 125 where the accused refused 
to talk to police but made incriminating statements to an undercover 
officer who was placed in his cell and who elicited the statements. The 
Court held that the police violated the accused’s right to silence, the 
essence of which was seen to be the freedom to choose whether to speak 
to police. This application of the section 7 right to silence is one situation 
where an accused who cannot claim the protection of the confessions 
rule can have a self-incriminating statement excluded on other grounds 
under the Charter. 
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Of course, the significance of the section 7 right to silence as an 
independent protection for interrogated suspects has recently been 
limited by Singh.126 Prior to Singh, some courts applied Hebert127 to 
interrogations by known police, holding that where detainees repeatedly 
asserted their intentions not to speak, unrelenting interrogation could 
override their choice and violate the section 7 pre-trial right to silence.128 
This extension of the Charter right to silence was used to exclude even 
voluntary statements.129 This line of authority ended with Singh, which 
established that the section 7 right to silence offers no independent 
protection to detainees interrogated by known police over and above the 
safeguards offered by the confessions rule itself. 
One might be tempted to read Singh130 as an unmitigated disaster for 
the defence, since it limited the scope of the section 7 right to silence. 
However, in one respect Singh enriched the safeguards offered by the 
confessions rule. In Singh, the Supreme Court recognized for the first 
time that unrelenting interrogation of a suspect who repeatedly asserts the 
right to silence may result in the exclusion of a confession.131 Admittedly, 
the majority suggested that such a confession should be excluded under 
the confessions rule, and not under the rubric of section 7. But, surely, 
from the point of view of defensive safeguard, what matters is the 
existence of an exclusionary remedy and not its doctrinal source.132 
Moreover, while the majority in Singh declined to hold that persistent 
police questioning rendered the statements involuntary in that case, that 
holding was largely based on deference to the ruling of the trial judge, 
who had fully considered the effect of the persistent questioning during 
the voluntariness voir dire.133 In different circumstances, such police 
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persistence might have raised a doubt about voluntariness. In sum,  
by acknowledging that persistent interrogation in the face of repeated 
assertions of the right to silence can vitiate voluntariness, Singh expanded 
in a small way the protection offered by the confessions rule. This 
recognition of the right to silence within the voluntariness inquiry may 
in future ground further protection for interrogated suspects. 
5. Educating Juries about False Confessions 
A final means of buttressing the protections of the confessions rule 
would be to educate juries about false confessions. Because the current 
rule permits police to use psychological interrogation methods that have 
been known to give rise to false confessions, one would expect that false 
confessions will sometimes be ruled voluntary and admissible. In such 
cases, the trier of fact must judge the reliability of the statement. 
Unfortunately, there is reason to believe that juries unfamiliar with the 
criminal justice system are ill equipped to judge the truthfulness of retracted 
confessions. Social science researchers suggest, and the Supreme Court 
of Canada has accepted, that ordinary people are reluctant to accept that 
innocent people confess to crimes.134 
It is always open to an accused to argue that a confession admitted 
at trial was coerced and untrue. Trial judges are required to review for 
the jury the positions of the parties and the evidence that supports them, 
including any evidence tending to confirm or refute the truth of a 
confession.135 Moreover, when confession evidence is disputed, judges 
must explain that it is for the jury to decide whether the alleged statements 
were made, whether the statements (if made) were true, and how much 
weight the statements (if true) should be given.136 However, current 
Canadian law lacks a mechanism for informing jurors about the risk of 
false confessions arising from police interrogation. 
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Experts are permitted to testify about any idiosyncratic psychological 
vulnerabilities that might have led a specific suspect to confess falsely.137 
But expert evidence on the general phenomenon of police-induced false 
confessions has not been accepted in Canadian trials,138 though such 
evidence has occasionally been admitted in other jurisdictions.139 In 
Canadian law, then, there is no recognized way to educate and warn 
juries about the features of psychological interrogation that have been 
found to result in false confessions, or even to challenge the commonsense 
belief that innocent suspects do not confess. Without some education on 
these issues, one wonders how juries can fairly evaluate the reliability of 
confessions. 
Recently, in R. v. Osmar,140 the Ontario Court of Appeal considered 
the issue of expert evidence on false confessions. The Court ruled  
the evidence inadmissible in the circumstances, which involved self-
incriminating statements made by the accused to police officers posing 
as members of a criminal organization. The Court was right to exclude 
the evidence on the facts because the witness’s expertise, which was on 
false confessions arising from police interrogation, appeared to have little 
or no application to statements emerging from undercover operations. 
Interestingly, however, Osmar left open the possibility that false 
confessions expert evidence could be admitted in a future case.141 The 
Court of Appeal’s openness should be applauded. In an appropriate case 
involving police interrogation, expert evidence on the phenomenon of 
false confessions could offer much-needed education to the jury. Armed 
with insight into the relationship between false confessions and 
interrogation practices, juries would be better able to evaluate a defence 
claim that a confession was untrue. 
Indeed, future courts might consider delivering this education through 
jury instructions.142 As the Supreme Court has observed, instructions have 
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advantages over expert evidence as a way of delivering social science 
information to juries: instructions are simple, fast and inexpensive, and 
the judge who delivers them is impartial.143 Moreover, many findings of 
false confessions researchers were judicially noticed and incorporated 
into the law in Oickle.144 The Supreme Court has endorsed the propositions 
that false confessions sometimes occur in the context of police 
interrogations, that a suspect’s vulnerability exacerbates the  risk of a 
false confession, that threats or promises from police contribute to false 
confessions, and so on. In the future, judges may offer some of this 
basic information on false confessions in the form of jury instructions. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The confessions rule constitutes a vital but limited safeguard for the 
accused. It offers some protection against two dangers: that innocent 
people will be convicted on the strength of false confessions, and that 
interrogated suspects will be treated unfairly. This paper has suggested 
several ways in which the protection offered by the confessions rule can be 
enhanced. Lawmakers can fortify the rule by imposing clearer limits  
on police practices, offering further guidance on vulnerable suspects, 
encouraging police to record interrogations, looking to other Charter 
rights as safeguards against coercive interrogation and finding ways to 
educate juries about the problem of false confessions. 
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